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Abstract Several recent studies have documented that
non-human primates can individuate objects according to
property and/or kind information in much the same way as
human infants do from around one year of age when they
begin to acquire language. Some studies suggest, however,
that only some properties are used for the individuation of
food items: color, but not shape. The present study inves-
tigated whether these ﬁndings reveal a true competence
problem with shape properties in the food domain or
whether they merely reveal a performance problem (e.g.,
lack of attention to shapes). We tested 25 great apes
(chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas) in two food individ-
uation tasks. We manipulated subjects’ experience with
differences in color and shape properties of food items.
Results indicated (i) that all subjects, regardless of their
prior experience, solved the color-based object individua-
tion task and (ii) that only the group with previous expe-
rience with different shape properties succeeded in the
shape-based individuation task. Great apes can thus be
primed to take shape into account for individuating food
objects, and this results clearly speaks in favor of a per-
formance (rather than a competence) problem in using
shape for object individuation of food items.
Keywords Object individuation  Shape  Color 
Food domain  Primates
Introduction
Human infants’ object cognition has been shown to
undergo a developmental shift around the ﬁrst birthday:
while from very early on, infants are capable of tracking
objects according to spatiotemporal criteria, only from
around 10 to 12 months do they become able to track and
individuate objects according to property and/or kind
information (e.g., Xu and Carey 1996; see Xu 2007 for a
review). As this ability has been found to correlate with
natural language comprehension (Xu and Carey 1996) and
to reveal itself in linguistically supported contexts speciﬁ-
cally (Xu 2002; Xu et al. 2005), one hypothesis is that
language is necessary for the development of this very
ability (Xu 2002).
Work with non-human primates (hereafter primates),
however, puts that bold hypothesis into question. Rhesus
monkeys and great apes have been found to individuate
objects according to their property/kind much in the same
way as human infants from around 1 year old do (Uller
et al. 1997; Santos et al. 2002; Phillips and Santos 2007;
Mendes et al. 2008): When they see an object with property
X or of kind A go into an empty box and then ﬁnd an object
with property Y or of kind B (unexpected), they search
longer than when they ﬁnd the original object (expected).
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cerning the question of which types of properties primates
use for individuating objects in different domains. In the
domain of food items, the only one which has been used in
object individuation studies so far, primates seem to
spontaneously use color differences to individuate objects
of the same kind, but not shape differences (Santos et al.
2002). That is, when they see, for example, a white food
item disappear in an empty box and then ﬁnd a blue one
instead, they continue searching. However, if they see a
round food item, they do not respond differently upon
ﬁnding a triangle one than upon ﬁnding the original round
one (Santos et al. 2002).
Similar behavior patterns are found in induction tasks
in which primate subjects have to decide on the edibility
of novel food items (for an overview, see Hauser and
Spelke 2004). In one study, for example, an experimenter
(E) ate, in full view of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta),
a food item which was new to the subjects. E then put
down two food items, one identical in color but not in
shape to the one E ate and another one different in color
but identical in shape. Monkeys approached signiﬁcantly
more often the food item identical in color but different in
shape compared to the item differing in color but identical
in shape to the one E ate (Santos et al. 2001; see also
Shutts et al. 2009).
This prevalence in the use of color properties over
shape properties in object individuation and induction in
the food domain stands in contrast to ﬁndings from the
domain of tool use. Here, primates have been found to
rely on shape properties (functionally relevant) and
neglect color (functionally irrelevant) when having to
choose among tools which are differentially appropriate
for a given problem (e.g. Hauser et al. 2002; Santos et al.
2003; Santos et al. 2006; see also Furlong et al. 2008 and
Bania et al. 2009 regarding the choice of tools with
functional relevant shape properties, over non-functional
ones, by chimpanzees).
This raises the question of how the restriction to certain
properties, namely color, in primates’ individuation of food
objects is to be explained, in particular in light of reverse
patterns in tool induction tasks. Does this restriction reﬂect
a true competence problem? One way such a competence
problem might arise would be that primates’ object indi-
viduation operates domain speciﬁcally and the domain-
speciﬁc ability is wired such that shape is not a property
that enters the picture in the food domain (whereas it does
in the domain of tools). Alternatively, the restriction to
certain properties found so far might reﬂect merely some
kind of performance problem such that primates can use
shape properties to individuate objects but do not sponta-
neously do so. One possibility along the latter lines would
be that shape is not salient enough for primates in the food
domain, but can be used for object individuation if made
more salient.
To test between such competence and performance
accounts, two groups of great apes were studied, with the
amount of experience with shape and color properties and
thus their salience being experimentally manipulated
between groups. One group (the ‘‘priming group’’) was
primed to attend to three different shapes and colors of
food items belonging to the same kind (food pellets). The
other group (the ‘‘naı¨ve group’’) remained naı ¨ve with
regard to shapes and colors other than the ‘‘regular’’ ones
(i.e., the regular color (brown) and shape (cylinder shaped)
of pellets). Both groups then performed object individua-
tion tasks similar to the ones previously used (Mendes et al.
2008; Santos et al. 2002), and their performance in color-
based and shape-based individuation of food items was
compared.
Table 1 Age, sex, and rearing history of the subjects that participated
in the study
Species Subject Age (years,
months)
Sex Rearing history
Bonobo Joey 24.0 M Hand reared
Kuno 10.1 M Hand reared
Limbuko 11.2 M Hand reared
Ulindi 13.2 F Mother
Yasa 9.4 F Mother
Chimpanzee Alex 4.9 M Hand reared
Alexandra 6.4 F Hand reared
Corry 29.2 F Hand reared
Dorien 25.3 F Hand reared
Fiﬁ 12.6 F Mother
Fraukje 29.10 F Hand reared
Frodo 12.2 M Mother
Gertrudia 12.6 F Mother
Jahaga 12.11 F Mother
Lome 4.3 M Mother
Natascha 25.10 F Hand reared
Patrick 8.7 M Mother
Pia 6.4 F Mother
Riet 28.3 F Hand reared
Robert 30.2 M Hand reared
Unyoro 8.10 M Mother
Gorilla Bebe 26.7 F Mother/Hand reared
N’Diki 28.1 F Mother/Hand reared
Ruby 8.0 F Hand reared
Viringika 10.9 F Mother
F Female; M Male
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Subjects
Sixteen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), ﬁve bonobos (Pan
paniscus) and four gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) participated in
the present study (see Table 1). There were nine males and
16 females. The average age of all the males was 12 years
and 4 months, and the average age of all the females was
17 years and 5 months. All subjects were socially housed at
the Wolfgang Koehler Primate Research Center, Leipzig
Zoo, Germany. Subjects had access to both indoor and
outdoor enclosures. All enclosures were furnished with
vegetation, climbing structures and visual barriers. Subjects
were neither food- nor water-deprived, and they could stop
participating in the task at any given moment. All subjects
had previously participated in a ﬁrst study investigating the
use of spatiotemporal and property/kind information during
an object individuation task (Mendes et al. 2008).
Apparatus
An opaque plastic box (40 9 40 9 34.5 cm) was used
during the experiment (see Fig. 1). The box had a circular
opening (approx. 8.5 cm in diameter) on its top middle part
which was used by the experimenter (E) to introduce a food
item (pellet). The frontal part of the box (facing the sub-
jects) had an opening (13 cm wide 9 6 cm high) which the
subjects could use to reach for the pellet. Such opening was
covered with a curtain (to avoid subjects looking inside it)
and could be closed using a sliding door manipulated by E.
In order to facilitate the surreptitious introduction of the
‘‘missing’’ pellet inside the box (during unexpected trials),
a horizontal sliding door was constructed on a false roof of
the box (9 cm high from its top part). Subjects were not
aware of that. A soft carpet was added to the ﬂoor of the
box. The carpet prevented the subjects to use possible
auditory cues that may have emanated from the fall of the
pellets on the ﬂoor of the box. The pellets used in the
current study were much harder than the food items used in
Mendes et al. (2008) and therefore produced a louder sound
that this way could be minimized.
In addition to the box, a plastic table (78 9 35 cm) was
also used but only during the priming phase. The table was
attached to a mesh window in the subjects testing room and
was used to place different colored or shaped pellets on its
top part.
Procedure
Testing was done by the same E as in our previous study
(Mendes et al. 2008), and the procedure was also very
similar to the one used in that study. A cameraperson
helped E by timing the trials and informed E when the
subject had retrieved the pellet from inside the box. The
experiment comprised three phases which were always
administered in the following order:
Priming phase
Subjects were divided into two groups. The priming group
(N = 13) was exposed to three different colors and shapes
of pellets. Previous to this study, subjects had never
experienced pellets different from the ‘‘regular’’ ones. In
contrast, the naı¨ve group (N = 12) remained naı ¨ve toward
colors and shapes other than the regular ones.
During the priming phase, E sat behind a table which
was attached to a mesh window in the subjects’ room.
Subjects received two blocks of trials; one block per each
condition (color and shape). The order of presentation of
the blocks was counterbalanced across subjects. Each block
contained three trials in which the pellets differed within
the same property (color or shape). In each trial, the three
pellets were placed on the table, aligned in a row and
handed one by one to the subject by E. The order of pre-
sentation of the pellets on the table was counterbalanced
across the three trials of the same block. Each block was
presented 24 h previous to the corresponding testing phase.
That is, subjects were exposed to a color priming 24 h
before the testing phase with different colored pellets and
analogously for shape priming and the corresponding
testing phase. On the day of the testing phase, but previous
to its start, the priming group received one more priming
Fig. 1 Drawing of the experimental apparatus (E’s perspective). The
X-ray view allows the reader to see the location of a pellet inside the
box
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123trial with the same property as the one of the test condition
to be next presented.
The colored pellets were red, blue and brownish (i.e.,
‘‘regular’’) ones. The red and blue colors were obtained by
adding an edible non-ﬂavored food coloring to the ‘‘regu-
lar’’ pellets. The shaped pellets had a form of a star, moon
and cylinder (i.e. ‘‘regular’’), all with equal volume. The
star and moon-shaped pellets were made from crushed
pieces of ‘‘regular’’ pellets, misted with water, molded into
the cookie cutters and ﬁnally dried.
Familiarization phase
On the same day, the testing phase began, but immediately
before its start, subjects could explore the new the box over
a 40-s period. In the case of the priming group, subjects
received the familiarization phase immediately after the
last priming trial.
Testing phase
Both priming and naı¨ve groups received two conditions, a
color and a shape conditions. Each condition contained
four trials, two expected and two unexpected trials. The
procedure was identical to the one described previously
(Mendes et al. 2008—Experiment 2). In the expected trials,
subjects saw E introducing pellet A inside the box, and
when allowed to reach, they found pellet A. In the unex-
pected trials, the box was initially baited with pellet B
(subjects were unaware of this manipulation) and they saw
E introducing pellet A. However, pellet A was surrepti-
tiously stored on the horizontal sliding door of the false
roof of the box. Once the sliding door was opened, subjects
found pellet B, different in properties but not in kind from
the one they saw being hidden.
The temporal structure in both expected and unexpected
trials was as follows (see Fig. 2 for a schematic illustration
of the applied procedure):
First reach period. Once the subjects had found the
pellet, the sliding door of the box was closed immediately
for a 20-s period (RP1).
Intermediate period After the ﬁrst reach period was
over, the sliding door was closed and the horizontal sliding
door was simultaneously opened so that the ‘‘missing’’
reward (in the unexpected trials) fell near the front corners
of the box. Thus, creating the impression that the reward
had always been there and that subjects had not found it
before because of its difﬁcult location, not because E had
manipulated it. While E closed and opened the sliding
door, simultaneously with the opening of the trap, she
spoke loudly (i.e., ‘‘Look at that!’’) to prevent subjects
from using auditory cues that may have emanated from the
fall of the ‘‘missing’’ pellet (applied in both expected and
unexpected trials). If subjects did not reach inside the box
or if they failed to ﬁnd the ‘‘missing’’ pellet in the unex-
pected trials, the trial was ended after 20 s.
Second reach period If subjects retrieved the ‘‘missing’’
reward, the door was immediately closed and re-opened
again for a last 20-s reach period (RP2).
The order of presentation of each condition (i.e., color
or shape) was counterbalanced within each group. Within
each condition, the order of presentation of the ﬁrst trial
was randomized. Expected and unexpected trials did not
occur twice in a row.
Coding and data analysis
All videos were digitalized and an observer coded them
using the Interact
 software (version 7). Following the
previous study (Mendes et al. 2008), there were two
dependent measures: (i) frequency of reaches inside the
box and (ii) duration of reaches inside the box. Regarding
frequency and duration of reaches, the mean values over
the two trials of the same type (expected and unexpected)
in each condition (shape and color) were computed.
Therefore, each subject had two mean frequency and two
mean duration values (corresponding to RP1 and RP2) for
expected and unexpected trials in the shape and color
conditions. A second observer, blind to the hypotheses of
the study, scored a random sample of 20% of the trials.
Inter-observer reliability for frequency was high (Pearson
correlation r = 0.985, P\0.001, N = 116 and weighted
Kappa = 0.910) as well as for duration of reaches (Pearson
correlation r = 0.997, P\0.001, N = 116).
As the data failed to fulﬁll the requirement for para-
metric testing, non-parametric tests were used in all anal-
yses (Kruskal–Wallis, Wilcoxon signed rank test, exact
Wilcoxon test for N B 15). We used one-tailed tests
because we had clear predictions, i.e., more and longer
reaching in unexpected than in expected trials and within
unexpected trials more and longer reaching in RP1 than in
Fig. 2 Illustration of the procedure during expected and unexpected
trials
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123RP2. Regarding the frequency and duration of reaches in
RP1 and RP2 of expected trials, no differences were
expected.
Results
Preliminary analyses: species and age effects
First, species and age effect were tested for by using the
scores obtained from the difference between (i) expected
and unexpected trials within the ﬁrst reach period (RP1);
(ii) expected and unexpected trials within the second reach
period (RP2), both for shape and color conditions. No
difference in performance between species or age classes
(infant: 0–5 year old; juvenile: 5–8 year old; subadult:
8–11 year old; adult[11) was found for any of the scores
aforementioned (Kruskal–Wallis test, all P[0.110). An
exception was a species difference in the shape condition
regarding the duration and frequency of reaches both
between expected and unexpected trials during the ﬁrst
reach period (RP1) (Kruskal–Wallis test: duration,
H = 6.38, P = 0.034; frequency, H = 5.03, P = 0.075).
Because signiﬁcant P values in each dependent variable
might be spurious, Fisher’s omnibus test was computed
(Haccou and Meelis 1994). The difference in duration and
frequency of reaches between expected and unexpected
trials during RP1 revealed no signiﬁcant difference
between species (Fisher’s omnibus test, duration:
v
2 = 8.67, df = 6, P = 0.19; frequency: v
2 = 8.02,
df = 6, P = 0.24), thus supporting the view of a spurious
signiﬁcance. Data were, therefore, collapsed across species
and age classes.
Main analyses
The main analyses tested the effect of the priming phase on
the mean frequency and duration of reaches during the ﬁrst
and second reach periods (RP1 and RP2).
Shape condition
If apes individuate object according to shape, two patterns
would be expected: (a) in the ﬁrst reaching period (RP1),
subject should search more often and longer in the unex-
pected than in the expected trials. (b) In the unexpected
trials, subjects search longer and more often in RP1
(searching for a missing pellet) than in RP2 (after having
found that pellet). Regarding (a), an analysis on the whole
sample revealed that during the ﬁrst reach period (RP1),
the priming group reached signiﬁcantly more often and for
longer time during unexpected compared with expected
trials (Wilcoxon signed rank test: frequency, T
? = 8.5,
N = 12, P = 0.005; duration, T
? = 11, N = 12, P =
0.013; Fig. 3). In contrast, during RP1, the naı¨ve group
did not show any signiﬁcant differences in frequency
or duration of reaching in expected compared with unex-
pected trials (frequency, T
? = 17, N = 9, P = 0.287;
duration, T
? = 25, N = 11, P = 0.260; Fig. 3).
Regarding (b), the corresponding analyses could only be
run with subjects who participated in RP2. In the inter-
mediate period, in each group, not all subjects retrieved the
‘‘missing’’ pellet in at least one of the two unexpected trials
(N priming group = 8 and N naı¨ve group = 8). Thus, differences
in performance across both reaching periods (RP1 and
RP2) was analyzed for this sub-sample only (the same sub-
sample analysis has been previously described elsewhere;
see Mendes et al. 2008). During unexpected trials, the
priming group reached signiﬁcantly more often and longer
during the ﬁrst (RP1) compared with the second reach
periods (RP2) (frequency: T
? = 3, N = 8, P = 0.023;
duration: T
? = 4, N = 8, P = 0.027; Fig. 4). However,
during the expected trials, the group reached equally often
and equally long during RP1 compared with RP2 (fre-
quency: T
? = 10, N = 7, P = 0.625, two-tailed; duration:
T
? = 10, N = 8, P = 0.313, two-tailed; Fig. 4).
In contrast to the performance of the priming group,
during unexpected trials, the naı¨ve group reached equally
often during the ﬁrst (RP1) compared with the second
Fig. 3 Mean average (?SE) frequency a and duration b of reaches
during the ﬁrst 20-s reach period (RP1) in both priming and naı¨ve
groups during the shape condition
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? = 8, N = 7, P = 0.180). How-
ever, the naı ¨ve group reached signiﬁcantly longer during
RP1 compared with RP2 (T
? = 5, N = 8, P = 0.039).
During expected trials, no signiﬁcant differences were
found between RP1 and RP2 both for frequency and for
duration of reaches (frequency: T
? = 10, N = 6, P = 1.0,
two-tailed; duration: T
? = 7, N = 8, P = 0.148, two-
tailed; Fig. 4).
Color condition
In contrast to the performance of the ‘‘priming’’ group in
the shape condition during the ﬁrst reach period (RP1), in
the color condition the same group did not show any dif-
ferences in frequency or duration of reaching in unexpected
compared with expected trials (Wilcoxon signed rank test:
frequency, T
? = 23.5, N = 11, P = 0.214; duration,
T
? = 25, N = 12, P = 0.151, Fig. 5). In contrast, during
RP1, the ‘‘naı ¨ve’’ group reached more often and for longer
time during unexpected compared with expected trials
(frequency, T
? = 10, N = 9, P = 0.080; duration,
T
? = 17, N = 11, P = 0.087, Fig. 5).
As for the shape condition, also here only some subjects,
from both groups, retrieved the ‘‘missing’’ pellet in at least
one of the two unexpected trials (N priming group = 10 and
N naı¨ve group = 8). Thus, as previously conducted, we will
focus on those subjects while analyzing their performances.
During unexpected trials, the priming group reached sig-
niﬁcantly more often and for longer time during RP1 than
during RP2 (frequency: T
? = 3, N = 8, P = 0.02; dura-
tion: T
? = 9, N = 10, P = 0.032, Fig. 6). In contrast,
during expected trials, the group reached signiﬁcantly more
often and for longer time during RP2 than during RP1
(frequency: T
? = 3, N = 8, P = 0.031, two-tailed; dura-
tion: T
? = 6, N = 10, P = 0.027, two-tailed, Fig. 6).
Similar to the performance of the priming group, during
unexpected trials, the naı¨ve group also reached signiﬁ-
cantly more often and for longer time during RP1 com-
pared with RP2 (frequency: T
? = 0, N = 7, P = 0.008;
duration: T
? = 4, N = 8, P = 0.027, Fig. 6). However,
during expected trials, no signiﬁcant differences were
found between RP1 and RP2 both for frequency and for
duration of reaches (frequency: T
? = 9, N = 6, P = 0.813,
two-tailed; duration: T
? = 9, N = 8, P = 0.250, two-tailed,
Fig. 6).
Discussion
Replicating previous work, the present study found that
great apes can spontaneously use color properties to indi-
viduate objects. The different previous experience (with or
without priming) of the two groups did not make much
Fig. 4 Mean average (?SE) frequency a and duration b of reaches
during both 20-s reach periods (RP1 and RP2) of those subjects
(N priming group = 8 and N naı¨ve group = 8) who found the ‘‘missing’’
pellet in at least one of the unexpected trials of the shape condition
Fig. 5 Mean average (?SE) frequency a and duration b of reaches
during the ﬁrst 20-s reach period (RP1) in both priming and naı¨ve
groups during the color condition
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123difference to their use of color: both groups showed
increased search behavior when ﬁnding a food item of a
different color compared to the one they originally saw and
showed decrease in search only after ﬁnding the original
item. With regard to shape properties, in contrast, the
present study showed that great apes can use shape to
individuate objects, but only after some previous experi-
ence: the priming group, unlike the naı¨ve group, also
showed the above-mentioned search patterns in shape-
based individuation tasks. What this clearly suggests is that
apes’ failure to spontaneously use shape for the individu-
ation of food items that was found in previous studies (and
replicated here) does not reﬂect any deep competence
problem. This lack of spontaneous shape-based food object
individuation can be alleviated with some previous expe-
rience—and with very little and very shallow experience (a
couple of encounters with the food items) indeed.
These ﬁndings have at least two wider implications.
First, there are implications regarding the nature of cog-
nition about food. In comparative and developmental
psychology, there is currently some debate about the
question of whether and to which degree food constitutes a
special cognitive domain with dedicated domain-speciﬁc,
hard-wired machinery (on a par with naı ¨ve physics, num-
ber, space etc.; see e.g., Hauser and Spelke 2004; Santos
et al. 2001; Shutts et al. 2009; Spelke and Kinzler 2007).
The accounts range from strong domain-speciﬁc nativism
(there are innate domain-speciﬁc beliefs—for example, in
the domain of food that color is a reliable indicator of
identity, whereas in the domain of tools, color is irrelevant
but shape matters.) via intermediate positions (e.g., there
are domain-speciﬁc learning mechanisms that gradually
lead to differential sensitivity to different properties in
different domains) to purely domain-general accounts (e.g.,
that there is only one kind of general purpose learning
mechanism that inductively picks up on different diag-
nostic values of different properties in different domains;
for an excellent exposition of this logical space of possible
accounts, see Shutts et al. 2009). The fact that some
experience—in fact, very little experience—can make
properties available for food object individuation that are
not spontaneously used (i.e., shape), speaks against any
strong domain-speciﬁc nativist position. In this respect, the
present ﬁndings are in line with developmental data that
differential attention to color as diagnostic property for
food individuation and induction is a relatively late
developing phenomenon that only arises after infancy
(Shutts et al. 2009). Both of these lines of research taken
together thus narrow down the logical space of accounts to
such construals that either posit weaker domain-speciﬁc
learning mechanisms (rather than strongly innate domain-
speciﬁc beliefs) or that posit domain-general learning
mechanisms leading to domain-speciﬁc predispositions
(e.g., Karmiloff-Smith 1992). Needless to say, more com-
parative and developmental research is needed to decide
between these and further narrow down the hypothesis
space.
Second, the present ﬁndings have some implications
regarding object individuation in non-human animals.
Against the background of the debate about potentially
uniquely human and linguistically constituted property/
kind-based object individuation, the present ﬁndings cor-
roborate previous ﬁndings that property-based object
individuation is possible in the absence of language.
Moreover, the ﬁndings suggest that property/kind-based
object individuation in primates is not just a very limited
phenomenon in some very restricted domain, say for just
one kind of property, but seems to be a more general and
reliable ability extending to different types of properties.
What the present ﬁndings do not tell us, however, is what
underlies primates’ competence in the kinds of tasks used
here. In particular, do these tasks tap true kind-based object
individuation, or do they just measure sophisticated
tracking of features (see Mendes et al. 2008;X u2002).
What we need in future research to decide between these
different possibilities are tasks that tease apart property and
kind information. This could be done, for example, by
introducing different kinds of object transformations
(property transformations pitted against kind transforma-
tions; see, e.g., Feigenson and Carey 2003; Xu et al. 2004,
Fig. 6 Mean average (?SE) frequency a and duration b of reaches
during both 20-s reach periods (RP1 and RP2) of those subjects
(N ‘‘priming’’ group = 10 and N ‘‘naı¨ve’’ group = 8) who found the
‘‘missing’’ pellet in at least one of the unexpected trials of the color
condition
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123for some attempts in these directions in infancy work). The
use of match-to-sample tasks (based on color and shape
properties) might also help to clarify the aforementioned
question.
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